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The sale of text advertisements on search engines using an auction format called 
Generalized Second Price (GSP) has become increasingly common.  GSP is unique in that 
it allows bidders to revise their bid if they are unhappy with the result of the auction, and 
because the auction sells multiple units of a related good simultaneously.  We model this 
sale as a hierarchical game with complete information, allowing one potential bidder to bid 
in each stage.  The hierarchical game has an entirely different set of equilibria from the 
simultaneous bid game studied in earlier research on this auction.  Under hierarchical 
bidding, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves guarantees higher auctioneer revenue than any 
equilibrium in GSP.   
1 Introduction
Text advertisements on search engines such as Google and Yahoo, re-
sponsible for over ten billion dollars of annual revenue at those two com-
panies alone, are sold in a Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. In
this auction, firms who wish to display their advertisement when a given
keyword is searched enter an auction for that keyword. This auction
runs continuously, and a firm’s bid reflects the amount that firm is will-
ing to pay if its ad is clicked by a search engine user (a clickthrough).
At any given time, the advertiser with the highest bid per clickthrough
is given the ad slot at the top of the webpage, the advertiser with the
second-highest bid per clickthrough is given the second ad slot, and so
on. Each slot is associated with a clickthrough rate, which represents
how often the slot attracts a clickthrough in a given time period. Af-
ter each bid, bidders are told where their ad will be placed, and how
much they will have to pay per clickthrough. If they are unsatisfied
with their current position, bidders are allowed to revise their bid at
any time. The firm in slot i pays the bid of the firm in slot i + 1 for
each clickthrough, hence the name Generalized Second Price. Naively,
GSP appears similar to standard, second-price Vickrey auctions, which
give the auctioneer revenue at least as high as any other auction format
(revenue-optimality), lead to the bidder with the highest willingness to
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pay receiving the top ad slot (eﬃciency), and induce bidders to sim-
ply submit their willingness to pay as their bid (truthfulness); indeed,
Google’s own advertising materials were making these claims as of 2006.
Given the importance of GSP to internet firms, there has been sub-
stantial interest in recent years concerning properties of this auction.
Previous research assumes that firms bid in stages, with the bids from
each player at each stage being sent to the auctioneer simultaneously.
Equilibria to a simultaneous game, in the Nash sense, are a vector of bids
such that no bidder, in hindsight, wishes to unilaterally deviate from
her strategy. This line of research has shown that, unlike second-price
Vickrey auctions, Generalized Second Price auctions are not necessarily
eﬃcient - that is, GSP may lead to allocations that do not maximize the
sum of payoﬀs to the auctioneer and the auction participants - and do
not induce truthful bidding as a dominant strategy.
We propose an alternative structure, where bids are sent by each
bidder in a hierarchy. An auction where, during any given momemt,
one bidder is picked at random to change her bid if she desires, taking
previous bids as given, fits this model. Since any firm can potentially be
the first bidder in a sequence, we define equilibria in this auction as the
intersection of equilibria of every possible perturbation of a hierarchical
game. Though many sequential games have no equilibria in the intersec-
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tion of every possible perturbation, the GSP auction has a computable
analytic set of equilibria in this intersection. With this solution concept,
equilibrium bidding is guaranteed to be eﬃcient, unlike in the simulta-
neous bid solution. Further, the auctioneer revenue in the hierarchical
game is shown to always be lower than Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
revenue, or the revenue to the auctioneer from distributing slots using
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism described in Section 2. This is
the opposite result of the well-known paper by Edelman et al (2007), who
solve for “locally envy-free” simultaneous bid equilibria, defined as Nash
equilibria such that no bidder wants to switch bids with any other bid-
der. Locally envy-free equilibria are guaranteed to be higher than VCG
revenue. That result has led many researchers to dismiss VCG as an
allocative mechanism in the case of text advertisement sales. However,
since VCG guarantees eﬃciency, is a truthful mechanism, and delivers
higher revenue than any hierarchical GSP equilibrium, our results sug-
gest that it may be preferable for search engines running auctions of this
type to sell by VCG rather than GSP.
The most straightforward discussion of simultaneous bid GSP is Edel-
man et al (2007), which first presented many of the results described in
Section 3 of this paper. Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) discuss prop-
erties of the first-price auction used originally by Overture/Yahoo! to
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sell keyword advertisements. Mehta et al (2007) and Borgs et al (2005)
consider the GSP problem when bidders are budget constrained. In
particular, when bidders are budget-constrained, it is optimal to bid as
high as possible within your equilibrium interval in order to push your
opponent out of the auction as quickly as possible. Zhou and Lukose
(2007) consider a “vindictive equilibrium” where bidders not only max-
imize their own profit, but also try to minimize one or more opponent’s
profits. They show that with two vindictive bidders, equilibria exist and
are eﬃcient, but that Nash equilibria do not generally exist with three
or more vindictive bidders. Aggarwal et al (2006) and Varian (2007)
extend GSP by allowing each advertisement to have a diﬀerent quality,
and therefore a diﬀerent clickthrough rate in any slot; this mimics the
actual procedure used at Google. Borgers et al (2007) also extend GSP,
but by giving payoﬀs that include an impression value, or a value that
depends simply on having the ad shown rather than on having the ad
clicked. Athey and Ellison (2008) allow consumers to vary their search
habits depending on the quality of displayed advertisements, and discuss
the usefulness of reserve prices in this context.
Cary et al (2008) is most similar to the spirit of this paper. They
allow bids to be submitted sequentially, and discuss an algorithm called
“Balanced Bidding” which converges to a Nash equilibrium of the static
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game with the same ordering and payments as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves.
But though the Balanced Bidding algorithm has asynchronous bidding,
bidders do not take into account the nature in which their bid will aﬀect
the bids of future bidders. Because of this, the structure is not hier-
archical, as in this paper, and the payments for every bidder are higher
than in the hierarchical game.
This article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide general
background on concepts in game theory, auction theory and mechanism
design that are used in later proofs. In Section 3, we describe the
auction model and review the literature using the simultaneous solution.
In Section 4, we describe the solution to the hierarchical game and its
properties. Finally, in Section 5, we show that endogenizing the number
of slots available is always in the best interest of the auctioneer, and that
this leads hierarchical bid GSP auctions to be ineﬃcient, unlike VCG.
2 Background
The proofs developed in this paper draw on definitions and theorems
from three intellectual strands: game theory, auction theory and mech-
anism design. In this section, we briefly introduce concepts from those
areas. In particular, in game theory we discuss equilibrium definitions,
extensive form games, Stackelberg equilibria, and hierarchical games. In
auction theory, we discuss the main results concerning first and second-
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price single-good auctions and multiple-slot auctions, as well as the Rev-
enue Equivalence Theorem. Finally, we introduce the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism.
2.1 Game Theory
A game is a situation of strategic interdependence. In many social sci-
ence problems, one agent’s optimization problem involves payoﬀs which
depend on the action chosen by other agents. A canonical example of
a game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where two prisoners must indepen-
dently decide whether to confess or lie about a crime, with the jail term
for both depending on the actions taken by both. Though situations
of strategic interdependence have surely been studied throughout his-
tory, and though specific games have been solved at least since Cournot
(1838), modern game theory is considered to have begun with the work
of Zermelo (1913), Borel (1921), and von Neumann and Morganstern
(1944). A general history of game theory’s development can be found
in Dimand and Dimand (1996). Myerson (1997) provides a more rigor-
ous introduction to the topics presented in this section.
A full description of a game involves knowing the players, the rules
(including what actions and information are available to every player
at all possible states of the game, represented by nodes), the outcomes
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of every possible set of actions, and the payoﬀs to each player given
those outcomes. This paper represents games in the extensive form Γ.
Formally, an extensive form game consists of
• A set of nodes N , a set of actions A and a set of players P.
• A function p specifying a single node preceding each node except
an initial node n0, which has no predecessor.
• A function a : N/n0 → A giving the unique action that leads to
any noninitial node from its immediate predecessor.
• A collection of information sets X consisting of all possible sets
of information known by the players, and a function H : N → X
assigning each node to an information set. The set of actions
available at any node with identical information must be identical.
• A collection of payoﬀ functions U assigning payoﬀs to each player
at each terminal node, where a terminal node is a node with no
successor nodes.
That is, an extensive form game can be fully described as
Γ(N,A, P, p(.), a(.),X,H(.), U)
. A strategy for each player is a function S : X → A specifying the
8
Figure 1: The simultaneous game
actions taken by an agent at every possible information state, such that
S(X) is a possible action at that information state. More extensive
details can be found in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).
Example 1 (Myerson 1997) Consider a game where two players choose
left or right simultaneously. If they both choose left, they both receive
payoﬀ 2. If they both choose right, Player 1 receives 3 and Player 2
receives 1. If Player 1 chooses left and Player 2 chooses right, Player 1
receives 4 and Player 2 receives 0. Finally, if Player 1 chooses right and
Player 2 left, then Player 1 receives 1 and Player 2 receives 0. Figure
1 displays this game.
The two numbers above each node represent who is moving at each
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node, and what information is available to that player. In this case,
information set 1 implies that neither player has moved, and information
set 2 implies that Player 1 has moved but that Player 2 does not know
what Player 1 has done. Note that no matter what Player 2 does, Player
1 would be better oﬀ playing left. Player 2, realizing that Player 1 will
always play left, will then also play left, and both players receive a payoﬀ
of 2.
The most well-known solution concept for a game is the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies
S = {S1, S2....} such that, given payoﬀ functions Ui and fixed bids from
all other players Sı˜,
Ui(Si, Sı˜) ≥ Ui(S0i, Sı˜) for all possible strategies S0i and all players i.
That is, taking other agents’ actions as given, a strategy for a player is
an equilibrium strategy if it is the best possible response to those other
agent’s actions. In the left-right game, (Left, Right) cannot be a Nash
equilibrium because, if Player 2 knows that Player 1 will go Left, then
Player 2 will also go Left. The only Nash equilibrium is (Left, Left).
Extensive form games can easily handle sequential moves. Consider
the game in Figure 2, which is identical to that in Figure 1 except for
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Figure 2: The sequential game
the information sets.
Information set 2 implies that Player 2 knows Player 1 has moved
left. Information set 3 means that Player 2 knows Player 1 has moved
right. That is, Player 1 now moves before Player 2, and Player 2 knows
what Player 1 has done. This is called a game of perfect information -
every player knows every other player’s past actions, and therefore the
information state at every node is unique. If Player 1 plays right, then
Player 2 maximizes her payoﬀ by moving right, with final payoﬀs (3,1).
If Player 1 plays left, then Player 2 will also play left, and the payoﬀs will
be (2,2). Knowing this, Player 1 will move right, and the final payoﬀs
will be (3,1). Note that this is diﬀerent from the simultaneous-move
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equilibrium.
In general, moving first in a sequential game is advantageous, but
this is not always the case. Consider a matching game, where both
players choose Heads or Tails, Player 1 wins if there is no match, and
Player 2 wins if there is a match. The player who moves first will always
lose in a sequential game, but will win half the time playing optimally
in the simultaneous game.
Equilibria in sequential games are slightly more complicated than
equilibria in one-move games. In particular, game theorists are generally
only interested in a set of equilibria called subgame-perfect equilibria. A
subgame is a subset of a game containing only a single decision node and
its successor nodes, such that if x is a node in the subgame, every other
node x0 with the same information state as x is also in the subgame.
Note that an entire game is a subgame. A set of strategies S is a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) if and only if the strategies
are a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. The reason for this definition
is to get rid of strategies based on non-credible threats. For instance, in
the sequential left-right game, Player 2 may threaten to play left should
Player 1 play right, giving Player 1 a payoﬀ of 1 if he plays right, but a
payoﬀ of at least 2 if he plays left. This threat is not credible, however -
once Player 1 plays right, a new subgame begins where the optimal play
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for Player 2 is right, not left. It has been proven that every finite game
of perfect information has a pure strategy SPNE.
A two-stage sequential game, with one player choosing her action in
the first stage, and n other players choosing their actions simultaneously
in the second stage, is commonly called the Stackelberg game. The
Stackelberg game originated in article by Stackelberg (1934), in which
the German economist considered production in an industry consisting
of one large “leader” firm and n smaller “follower” firms. The Stackel-
berg leader is often, but not always, able to extract a greater payoﬀ in
the sequential game than in a simultaneous game, as seen in the sequen-
tial left-right example. A generalization of the Stackelberg game is the
n-hierarchy game, where n firms act in sequence, with firm i acting as
a follower for firms with rank i0 < i and as a leader of firms with rank
i0 > i. Hierarchical games have been used to examine, for instance, the
amendment process in a legislature (Baron and Ferejohn 1989), sequen-
tial prisoners’ dilemmas (Vukov and Szabo 2005) and economic market
formation (Boyer and Moreaux 1986).
2.2 Auction Theory
There are many ways through which objects may be allocated to indi-
viduals - a common mechanism is called a price, where the first agent
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who arrives willing to pay a set amount gets the object. Auctions are
often a useful way to allocate objects when potential buyers’ willingness
to pay is unknown and when the cost of holding the auction, as opposed
to simply setting a price, is low. An auction, formally, is a mechanism
through which agents’ willingness to pay for an item is elicited (with
bids) given a set of rules for how an item is allocated after those bids.
Auctions are universal in that an auction mechanism does not depend
on the item being auctioned. Further, auctions are anonymous in that
the identity of bidders plays no role in determining the allocation of the
item and the resulting payments (see, for example, Krishna 2002). The
study of bidder behavior in auctions is a subdiscipline of game theory.
Auctions have a long and colorful history. Herodotus, in his History
of the Persian Wars, discusses the Babylonian custom of auctioning
wives:
Once a year in each village the maidens of age to marry
were collected all together into one place; while the men
stood round them in a circle. Then a herald called up the
damsels one by one, and oﬀered them for sale. He began with
the most beautiful. When she was sold for no small sum of
money, he oﬀered for sale the one who came next to her in
beauty. All of them were sold to be wives. The richest of
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the Babylonians who wished to wed bid against each other
for the loveliest maidens, while the humbler wife-seekers, who
were indiﬀerent about beauty, took the more homely damsels
with marriage-portions. (Herodotus, I.196)
Since that time, auctions have been used to sell Dutch tulips, fine
art, slaves, wireless spectra, the belongings of deceased Chinese monks,
government procurement contracts, and even, at one point, the entire
Roman Empire (Klemperer 2004, Damianov 2005 and Shubik 1983).1 In
this section, we briefly introduce the four most common single-unit auc-
tion formats, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, the concept of optimal
auctions, and first and second-price multiple-unit auctions.
The four most common auction formats are the English Auction, the
Dutch Auction, the sealed-bid first-price auction, and the sealed-price
second-price auction.
In the English auction, believed to be the format used to auction
Babylonian wives, an auctioneer calls out a low price and potential bid-
ders indicate whether they are interested in buying at that price. The
auctioneer then begins increasing the price by small increments as long
1The Praetorian Guard auctioned oﬀ the Roman Empire to whoever was willing
to pay the highest price per man to the Guard. Didius Julianus oﬀered 25,000
sesterces per man, and was duly appointed Emperor. Generals in the provinces,
however, were enraged at the auction, and within two months, Septimius Severus
reached Rome and had Didius Julianus beheaded.
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as at least two bidders remain interested. The last bidder to remain wins
the item and pays an amount equal to the price at which the second-to-
last bidder dropped out.
A Dutch auction (so called because it was used to auction tulips
in 17th century Holland) proceeds in reverse; the auctioneer begins by
calling out a very high price, and lowers the price by small increments
until one bidder enters. The first bidder to enter wins the item at
the given price. Together, Dutch and English auctions are called open
auctions, since each bid is public rather than sealed.
In a sealed-bid first-price auction, bidders submit their willingness
to pay, or private value, for an item in sealed envelopes; the highest
bid submitted wins the item, paying the bid submitted. A sealed-bid
second-price auction is similar except that the winning bidder pays the
second-highest bid submitted. In the sealed-bid, second-price strategy,
it is optimal for every bidder to bid their private value; if the winning
bid is above a bidder’s private value, then that bidder would have had
to pay more than their private value to win the item, and therefore
would not have wanted to win. If the winning bid is below a bidder’s
private value, the bidder wins the item and pays the second-highest
private value. Since the winning bidder cannot control the second-
highest bidder’s bid, she can do no better than winning the item and
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paying the second-highest private value.
An important feature of auctions is that each agent’s private value
is unknown to other bidders and to the auctioneer. If private values
were known to the auctioneer, of course, it would be straightforward to
simply allocate the item to the bidder with the highest private value and
charge her exactly that amount. In this paper, we consider only private
value auctions, where each bidder knows exactly her private value, rather
than common value auctions, where the object’s worth is unknown to
the bidders at the start of the auction. An example of a common value
auction might be the sale of an unexplored oil field; each firm may have
some estimate of how much oil is in the field, but the bidders will also
hope to improve their estimate based on the bidding behavior of other,
knowledgeable firms.
Note that the Dutch auction and the sealed-bid first-price auction are
equivalent. The only information learned during a Dutch auction is the
value of the first bid submitted, which causes the auction to end. There
is no strategic diﬀerence between oﬀering a bid for a certain price in a
sealed-bid first-price auction and planning to oﬀer a bid when the Dutch
auction reaches that price. Moreover, with independently-distributed
private values, English auctions and sealed-bid second-price auctions
have equivalent strategies. In the English auction, it is clearly optimal
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to stay in the auction until the price passes a bidder’s willingness to pay.
The item will then be allocated to the bidder with the highest private
value, and the final payment will be exactly the second highest private
value. The final allocation and payments in the sealed-bid, second-
price auction, then, will be exactly the same as the English auction.
Note that the English auction and the second price auction have the
property of truthfulness - every bidder reveals her true private value.
Truthful bidding is induced because, regardless of what other bidders
do, each bidder can maximize her profit by submitting her true private
value. This is not true of the Dutch and the first price auctions, since
the bidder with the highest private value has an incentive to bid under
her true private value based on her expectation of the distribution of
other bidder’s private values. Indeed, the optimal bid is E[Y |Y < x],
where x is a bidder’s private value and Y is the highest of the other
independently drawn values; this result assumes that each bidder knows
the distribution of other bidders’ private values, but not the exact value.
Vickrey (1961) and more generally, Myerson (1981), proved that an
auctioneer’s expected revenue from any of the above auctions is the same.
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is of enormous importance in auction
theory. It holds for all four auctions mentioned in this section as well
as stranger auctions such as the all-pay auction, where only the winning
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bidder gets the item but every bidder pays, as in political lobbying. The
theorem is stated here, but the rather involved proof is omitted because
of length; a version may be found in Krishna (2002).
Theorem 2 (Revenue Equivalence Theorem) Assume there exist N
risk-neutral bidders for an object, with each bidder holding a private value
vi drawn from a common, strictly increasing, atomless distribution on
[v
¯
, v¯]. Then any auction where the object always goes to the bidder with
the highest private value, and where a bidder with private value zero will
pay zero, will provide the same revenue to the auctioneer and the same
payments (in expectation) from the bidders (Klemperer 2004).
An eﬃcient auction is one in which the item is distributed to the
bidder with the highest private value; the discussion above shows that
the four most common auction formats are all, given the assumption of
a common distribution of private values among bidders, eﬃcient. An
optimal auction is one in which the auctioneer’s expected revenue is
maximized. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem guarantees that all four
auctions are optimal. Since each auction format is optimal, auctioneers
should be indiﬀerent, in theory, between selling goods with any of the
formats.
Finally, consider auctions for which multiple items are sold. Multi-
ple unit auctions have attracted enormous attention in recent years, due
19
to their use in stock IPOs, spectrum auctions, and Federal Reserve Trea-
sury Auctions. For simplicity, we direct attention only to multiple unit
auctions where each bidder desires at most one unit. Note that multi-
ple units may be sold simultaneously, where each item is allocated after
one auction is held according to some mechanism, or sequentially, where
single-unit auctions are held until all of the units have been disposed of.
Two common simultaneous auctions for k units are the Vickrey auc-
tion and the discriminatory auction. In a discriminatory auction, the
k highest bidders pay their bid and receive one unit. In the Vickrey
auction, the k highest bidders all win one unit and each pay the amount
of the highest non-winning bid. Given the assumption of single-unit
demand, both auctions allocate eﬃciently, and a version of the Rev-
enue Equivalence Theorem applies (see Krishna 2002 and Krishna and
Perry 1998). It can be proven that sequential sealed-bid first-price and
sealed-bid second-price auctions also allocate eﬃciently and are revenue
equivalent to the two simultaneous auctions. However, the mathematics
in the case of multi-unit demand, where bidders demand more than one
unit according to some demand schedule, are considerably more diﬃcult.
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2.3 Mechanisms
While bidder behavior in auctions is a subset of game theory, the design
of auctions themselves is a subset of mechanism design. Consider a
planner who wishes to aggregate individual preferences and allocate re-
sources accordingly. Individuals hold private information, such as their
private valuation of a resource, and may not be willing to divulge true
information if, given the allocation methods (or mechanism) of the plan-
ner, that individual may improve her welfare by lying. The information
revelation problem constrains the mechanisms available to a planner;
solving the problem of optimal mechanism design, therefore, has been
an extraordinarily active field of social science research since Hurwicz’s
(1960) seminal paper on the topic. In this section, we briefly introduce
two concepts from mechanism design which will be important to the
study of GSP auctions: the revelation principle and the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism. An in-depth exploration of mechanism design can
be found in Hurwicz and Reiter (2008).
Formally, a mechanism is a function Θ(S1, ...., SN , g(·)), where Si
represents the strategies available to agent i, and g : S1 × ...× SN → X
is a function mapping the strategies of each player into an outcome X.
A mechanism implements f(·) if there is a Nash equilibrium strategy
profile R of the game induced by Θ such that g(R) = f(·). That
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is, f is implementable only if there exists some mechanism inducing an
equilibrium strategy that gives the allocation f . Let each agent have a
piece of private information denoted λi. A mechanism for which Si = λi
for each i is an equilibrium to the game induced by g is called a direct
revelation mechanism, in that each agent simply tells g(·) her true type.
Example 3 Consider a society wishing to choose its leader. One mech-
anism Θ might be that each individual gets to vote on the leader, and
whichever leader gets the most votes will win. Assume that there are
at least 3 candidates and at least 3 voters. Let each voter rank the
candidates by preference, and let f(·) be a mapping from preferences to
an outcome that is a) non-dictatorial (the election must account for the
preferences of at least two voters), b) Pareto eﬃcient (if all voters prefer
A to B, then B must not be able to win), and c) disregards irrelevant
alternatives (if the mechanism chooses A over B, then adding C into the
election shouldn’t cause the mechanism to rate B over A). Is f(·) imple-
mentable? That is, is there a voting mechanism such that self-interested
voters, voting based on their preferences, will induce an election with the
three properties listed above? There is not. This is the famous Arrow
Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1950).
It may seem very diﬃcult, then, to find what allocations are imple-
mentable, as this appears to involve searching over all possible mech-
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anisms! However, the revelation principle says that, if an allocation
can be implemented by some indirect mechanism, then it can be imple-
mented by a direct mechanism (Gibbard 1973). Therefore, to find what
allocations are implementable, only direct mechanisms need to be exam-
ined. The reasoning behind the revelation principle is straightforward.
Assume that there exists a (perhaps very complicated) mechanism where
agents input their private values vi and play some complicated strategy
si which, given the chosen mechanism, leads to outcome g(si(vi)). Now
create a outcome rule f(·) such that f(vi) = g(si(vi)). Since si(vi) is
optimal under outcome rule g(·), vi must be optimal under outcome rule
f(·), and f as defined is a direct mechanism. In the context of auc-
tions, the revelation principle means that if an auction outcome can be
induced by non-truthful bidding given a certain auction rule, then there
must exist some other auction rule such that the same outcome can be
induced by bidders simply submitting their true private values.
In auctions, a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction is a direct mech-
anism such that the agent with the highest private value receives the
object, and that each agent’s payment is based on the indirect eﬀect, or
externality, that she imposes on other players by entering the auction.
Consider a single-object auction with private values {va, vb} = {10, 4}.
First, allocate the object to the bidder with the highest value (in this
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case, bidder a). Now note that, had a not been in the auction, b would
have received value 4 from the object. Therefore, the VCG mechanism
gives agent a the object, and charges a a price of 4. This result is simply
the sealed-bid second-price auction; such auctions are sometimes called
Vickrey auctions for this reason. The Vickrey auction for multiple units
described in the Section 2.2 is simply the multiple unit analogue of the
VCG mechanism. Proofs of why VCG induces truthful bidding can
be found in Vickrey (1961), and generalizations can be found in Clarke
(1971) and Groves (1973).
3 Simultaneous Bid Solution
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is used principally to sell
advertisements displayed alongside keyword searches at search engines.
Before 1997, internet advertisers paid a fixed amount to have their ad-
vertisement displayed a set number of times; for instance, a cost-per-
thousand (CPT) of $10.00 meant that a potential advertiser would pay
ten dollars to have their advertisement displayed one thousand times.
Beginning in 1997, Overture began selling advertisements in an auction,
where bidders bid on a per-clickthrough basis on a particular search en-
gine keyword. Every time a bidder’s ad was clicked, Overture charged
the bidder an amount equal to their most recent bid, and advertisements
24
Figure 3: Text ads from a Google search
with higher bids were displayed more prominently. Bidders were allowed
to change their bid as frequently as they wanted (Edelman et al 2007
and Battelle 2005 discuss this history in greater depth). Figure 3 shows
four text advertisements that were displayed during a recent search for
“algebra.”
The ability to change bids continuously in this auction leads to a lack
of stability, however. Consider two bidders that value each clickthrough
at va and vb, such that va > vb. Let there be two advertising slots
available, with clickthrough rates c1 and c2, such that c1 > c2. Assume
there exists an equilibrium such that player a bids ba and player b bids
bb. If ba > bb+ε, then player a can improve her profit by simply lowering
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her bid, and therefore her payment, by ε/2; a similar argument applies
if bb > ba+ε. If ba = bb, then depending on how the auction breaks ties,
the player assigned the second slot can improve her payoﬀ by bidding
ε higher, and getting vi(c1 − c2) − c2ε more profit. These first-price
auctions do not have any equilibria and bidders must update their bids
over and over as fast as their bidding program is able to submit bids.
For this reason, both Google AdWords and Yahoo!/Overture today
use second-price auctions where bidders are ranked by the amount of
their bid, and the bidder in position i pays the bid of the bidder in
position i+ 1. This auction may be described formally as follows:
Definition 4 (Generalized Second Price Auctions) Consider an auction
with n bidders and k slots, with n ≥ k. Each slot is associated with a
publicly-known clickthrough rate ci. Each bidder has a linear private
valuation of a clickthrough equal to vi. Each bidder submits a publicly-
known bid bi. Given an n-by-1 vector of bids b, the bidders are ordered,
and the top slot is given to the bidder with the highest bid, the second
slot to the bidder with the second highest-bid, and so on. Once the
auction ends, each bidder pays the bid of the player directly below them
per clickthrough, and the profit of each bidder is said to be (vi − bi+1)ci.
At any time, a bidder may revise her bid. The auction ends when no
bidder wishes to further revise her bid.
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In practice, clickthrough rates and bids (other than bi+1, since the
bidder knows what she will pay should the auction end, and this amount
is simply the bid of the player directly below her) are not necessar-
ily known by all bidders. However, auctioneers such as Google have
traditionally oﬀered potential bidders an estimated clickthrough rate.
Further, the bids of other players can be easily calculated by switching
one’s bid until one has been placed into every slot, and has therefore
learned bi+1 for all i. In this paper, we follow the literature and assume
bids and clickthrough rates are known to all bidders.
In order to solve for equilibria of this auction, the timing of the bids is
critical. Consider a model where bids occur in stages, and every bidder
submits a bid simultaneously in every stage. Given simultaneous bids,
a Nash equilibrium to the auction means that no player can improve her
profit by changing her bid, taking other players’ bids as given. Note
that, in order to move up one position, a player must bid higher than
the bid of the player one spot above her, but in order to move down one
position, a player must bid lower than the player one spot below her,
and higher than the bid of the player two spots below her (Varian 2007).
That is, a Nash equilibrium is
(vi − bi+1)ci≥ (vi − bj)cj for i > j
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(vi − bi+1)ci≥ (vi − bj+1)cj for i < j
for all i, j.
Since any change in a player’s bid that does not change her position
will not change her payments or profit, these inequalities are satisfied by
intervals of bids, and thus Nash equilibria are not unique.
The Nash equilibria to simultaneous bid GSP have two unfortunate
properties. First, there are equilibrium bids that are not eﬃcient, mean-
ing that bidders with lower valuation are assigned higher slots. Consider
the following example from Borgers et al (2007):
Example 5 Let there be three bidders with private values v = [16, 15, 14],
and three slots with clickthrough rates c = [3, 2, 1]. Consider the vec-
tor of bids [7, 9, 11]. Profits in this auction are [(16− 0) ∗ 1, (15− 7) ∗
2, (14−9)∗3] = [16, 15, 15]. It is straightforward to check that the vector
of bids is an equilibrium; no bidder can improve her payoﬀ by unilaterally
changing her bid. Note that the bidder with lowest private value receives
the highest slot, and the bidder with the highest private value receives the
lowest slot.
Further, unlike in the second-price auctions discussed in Section 2,
simultaneous bid GSP is not truthful. That is, the vector of bids equal
to private values (b = v) is not necessarily an equilibrium. Aggarwal et
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al (2006) oﬀer the following example:
Example 6 Let there be three bidders with private values v = [200, 180, 100]
and two slots with clickthrough rates c = [.5, .4]. Let b = [200, 180, 100].
Bidder 1 makes profit .5(200− 180) = 10 with her current bid, but will
make .4(200−100) = 40 if she bids below 180 but more than 100. There-
fore b = [200, 180, 100] is not an equilibrium.
Edelman et al (2007) consider a simpler set of equilibria, called locally
envy-free equilibria.
Definition 7 (Locally envy-free) A set of bids is a locally envy-free equi-
libria if no player would prefer to switch bids with any other player. This
is equivalent to requiring that no player wishes to switch bids with the
player who bid directly above her. That is,
ci(vi − bi+1) ≥ ci−1(vi − bi)
for all i.
Locally envy-free equilibria are a subset of Nash equilibria, and are
guaranteed to be eﬃcient. Further, locally envy-free equilibria have a
natural link to stable assignments in a two-sided matching game such
as that studied in Shapley and Shubik (1972). However, given that
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there are auctions without truthful Nash equilibria, auctions such as the
one discussed in Example 6 also do not have a truthful locally envy-free
equilibrium.
Since locally envy-free equilibria are eﬃcient, the revelation principle
guarantees the existence of a truthful mechanism which induces the same
equilibrium payments and auctioneer revenue. Consider the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves analogue of the GSP auction. In VCG, bidders are ranked
based on their bids, and each bidder pays the externality her entry into
the auction imposed on other bidders by changing what slot they win.2
In an auction with 5 bidders and 4 slots, let a bidder bid such that her bid
is ranked second. Her entry into the auction places the formerly-second
bidder in the third slot, places the formerly-third in the fourth slot, and
forces the formerly-fourth to win no slot. Therefore, VCG would have
the bidder ranked second pay (c2 − c3)b3 + (c3 − c4)b4 + (c4)b5. It is
well-known that VCG mechanisms always have truthful bidding as a
dominant strategy.
Example 8 Consider an auction with private values v = [8, 5, 4] and
slots with c = [2, 1]. Truthful bidding is a Nash (and locally envy-free)
equilibrium, with total payments for each bidder equal to [10, 4, 0] and
payoﬀs equal to [6, 1, 0]. Consider the VCG mechanism with true values
2A derivation of VCG in this context is given in Appendix A.
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submitted, however. If Player 1 were not in the auction, Player 2 would
be in slot 1 and would receive an additional (2 − 1) ∗ 5 = 5. Player 3
would be in slot 2 and would receive an additional (1−0)∗4 = 4. Player
1, therefore, would pay 5 + 4 = 9 under VCG. By a similar argument,
Player 2 would pay 4 under VCG, and Player 3 would pay 0. VCG
payments, then, are [9, 4, 0] and payoﬀs are [7, 1, 0].
Note that VCG payoﬀs in this example are higher than under the
locally envy-free equilibria examined. Edelman et al (2007) show that
in any GSP auction, there exists a locally envy-free equilibrium with
positions, payoﬀs and auctioneer revenue equal to VCG, but that this
equilibrium has the lowest auctioneer revenue of any of the locally envy-
free equilibria to that auction. That is, even though VCG is simple in
that a bidder needs only to truthfully submit her private value, and even
though VCG induces positions, payoﬀs and auctioneer revenue equal to
a locally envy-free equilibrium, an auctioneer may not want to sell ads
using VCG because any other locally envy-free equilibrium will give the
auctioneer higher revenue. Even if all Nash equilibria, and not just
locally envy-free equilibria, are considered, there are still many Nash
equilibria with auctioneer revenue higher than under VCG.
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4 The Hierarchical Game
In the simultaneous-bid GSP auction analyzed in the previous section,
Nash equilibria can be ineﬃcient and auctioneers may be hesitant to use
VCG because GSP always induces bids that, in equilibrium, give the
auctioneer higher revenue. In this section, we modify the timing of bids.
Rather than having every bidder submit bids simultaneously each stage,
we let one bidder bid in each stage, taking earlier bids from other bidders
as given. That is, bidding will be hierarchical. Players who bid before a
given bidder are called leaders, and players who bid after a given bidder
are called followers. Every bidder will bid in best response to bids from
leaders, and will bid assuming best responses from bidders who follow.
In general, as in the Stackelberg Duopoly game, hierarchical bidding will
not induce the same set of equilibria as simultaneous bidding.
Since bids are submitted in a hierarchy, the question remains as to
what order the bidders should be allowed to submit bids. We remain
agnostic on the ordering, but assume that an equilibrium set of bids is
such that, no matter what order the bidders bid in, no bidder has an in-
centive to change her bid. Formally, an ordered hierarchical equilibrium
(OHE) is an n-by-1 vector of bids b and resultant profits π for each bid-
der such that, for any ordering of bidders, the lowest equilibrium profit
for every bidder is less than or equal to π.
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Why is hierarchical bidding sensible in GSP auctions? Nothing
inherent in the Google or Yahoo auctions requires bidders to submit
bids simultaneously. In practice, they are always able to wait an extra
second in order to view the latest bids submitted by other potential
buyers. Further, as noted in Cary et al (2008), though bids may be
updated as frequently as a bidder likes, there is a (very short) random
delay between when a bid is submitted to the auctioneer and when that
new bid is accepted. A model where, in each stage, one randomly
selected bidder is allowed to change her bid is equivalent to hierarchical
bidding.
The following example motivates why hierarchical bidding can lead
to diﬀerent equilibria.
Example 9 Consider a vector of private values v = [10, 4, 2], and click-
through rates c = [2, 1, 0]. The vector of truthful bids b = [10, 4, 2] is
a locally envy-free equilibrium; no player wishes to switch bids with any
other player. Because locally envy-free equilibria are a subset of Nash
equilibria, [10, 4, 2] is also a Nash equilibrium. Note that Bidder 2 is
completely indiﬀerent between bidding anywhere in the interval (2, 10),
but that Bidder 1 wants Bidder 2 to bid as low as possible. If bids are
not simultaneous, then Bidder 1 can bid, for instance, 3.50, knowing that
Bidder 2 will then improve her profit by then changing her bid to some-
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where in the interval (2, 3.50). Bidder 1 cannot bid below 3, however,
because then Bidder 2 would prefer to bid above her. Let Bidder 1, then,
bid 3 + ε, which induces Bidder 2 to then change her bid to somewhere
in (2, 3). No bidder can then improve their profit, and the auction ends
with bids [3 + ε, (2, 3), 2].
In general, it is diﬃcult to solve for equilibria to hierarchical games.
These games belong to a class of problems called multilevel programs,
which are proven to be strongly NP-hard (Luo et al 1996). Intuitively,
the bidder who bids first is solving an optimization problem taking fol-
lowers’ bids as best responses to her bid, the bidder who bids second
solves an optimization problem taking the first bidder’s bid as given and
taking followers’ bids as best responses to her own bid, and so on. In
order to solve for the first bidder’s bid, the last bidder’s best response as
a function of every other player’s bids is substituted into the second-to-
last player’s optimization problem, and on up the chain until the second
bidder’s best response is substituted into the first player’s optimization
problem. Each player’s best response function is often neither smooth
nor connected.
In order to find equilibria, then, we first find equilibria to the hierar-
chical game where players bid in the order of their private values; this is
called the private-value ordering. After showing that equilibria to this
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ordering must be eﬃcient, it is straightforward to solve for the equilibria
algebraically. We then show that, given any other ordering, equilibria
must be eﬃcient. Finally, we show that, since equilibria in any ordering
are eﬃcient, no bidder can improve her profit from the profit attained in
the private-value ordering. With equilibria in hand, we then show that
OHE are a subset of Nash equilibria, and that the VCG solution gives
auctioneer revenue at least as high as any OHE.
Lemma 10 The equilibria in the private-value ordering hierarchical game
are eﬃcient.
Proof. Let bi < bj, vi > vj > vk. Let i bid before j. Assume that
bids are in equilibrium. Bidder i receives profit πi = (vi − bk)ci and
bidder j receives profit πj = (vj − bi)cj. If bidder j bids directly below
i instead, she will receive (vj − bk)ci. Since bids are in equilibrium,
(vj − bi)cj ≥ (vj − bk)ci and therefore bi ≤ vj − (vj − bk) cicj .
Note that bidder i makes profit
(vi − bk)ci = vici − bkci (1)
by letting bi ≤ vj − (vj − bk) cicj , but makes profit (vi − bj)cj by letting
bi > vj − (vj − bk) cicj since j will then bid below i. In that case, since bj
will be less than bi, and since bi can be as low as vj − (vj − bk) cicj , profit
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for bidder i will be (vi − bj)cj ≥ (vi − (vj − (vj − bk) cicj ))cj =
vicj − bkci + vj(ci − cj). (2)
Note that profit in Eq. 2 is always greater than that of Eq. 1, since
vi(cj − ci) > vj(cj − ci)
⇒ vi(cj − ci) + bkci > vj(cj − ci) + bkci
⇒ vi(ci − cj)− bkci < vj(ci − cj)− bkci
⇒ vici − bkci < vicj − bkci + vj(ci − cj).
Therefore bidder i will always bid such that bidder j wishes to bid
below her; this contradicts the assumption that bi < bj can be an equi-
librium.
If the private-value ordering equilibrium is eﬃcient, three conditions
must hold. First, bi < bi−1. Second, the bidder directly below i
must not want to bid above bi; that is, (vi+1 − bi+2)ci+1 ≥ (vi+1 − bi)ci.
Third, the bidder directly above bidder i must not want to bid below
bidder i, so (vi−1 − bi)ci−1 ≤ (vi−1 − bi+1)ci. Rearranging terms, bi ∈
(vi+1−(vi+1−bi+2) ci+1ci ,min{bi−1, vi−1−(vi−1−bi+1) cici−1}). In an auction
with k slots, we assume that any bidder j > k simply bids her private
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value vj; the bidder in that slot pays nothing and makes no profit. By
bidding private value, she ensures that she will enter the auction if it
becomes profitable for her to do so, such as if a bidder above her were to
drop out. Also, for the bidder with the highest private value, the right
hand side of the bid interval is ∞. Finally, for bidder k, the left hand
side of the bid interval simplifies to vk+1. Any eﬃcient vector of bids,
then, is constrained as follows, with slots k = n− 1 for simplicity.
Lemma 11 Every eﬃcient vector of bids is constrained to the following
form:
bN = vN (3)
bN−1=(vN ,min{bN−2, vN−2 − (vN−2 − bN)cN−1
cN−2
})
...
bi=(vi+1 − (vi+1 − bi+2)
ci+1
ci
,min{bi−1, vi−1 − (vi−1 − bi+1) ci
ci−1
})
...
b2=(v3 − (v3 − b4)
c3
c2
,min{b1, v1 − (v1 − b3)c2
c1
})
b1=(v2 − (v2 − b3)
c2
c1
,∞)
Bidder 1’s profit is equal to (v1 − b2) c1, so profit is maximized by
minimizing b2. Since b2 must be lower than min{b1, v1 − (v1 − b3) c2c1},
bidder 1 maximizes profit by choosing the lowest possible b1 = v2−(v2−
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b3)
c2
c1
. Note that since v2 < v1, b1 = v2 − (v2 − b3) c2c1 < v1 − (v1 − b3)
c2
c1
.
Likewise, b2 minimizes b3, and therefore maximizes profit, by bidding
b2 = v3 − (v3 − b4) c3c2 . Note that for any bid in (vN ,min{bN−2, vN−2 −
(vN−2 − bN) cN−1cN }), bidder N − 1’s profit is the same. This is because
bidder N always bids vN in an eﬃcient auction.
Theorem 12 The equilibrium bids of the private-value ordering hierar-
chical game are
vi+1 − (vi+1 − bi+2)
ci+1
ci
, i < k (4)
(vi+1,min{bi−1, vi−1 − (vi−1 − bi+1) ci
ci−1
}), i= k
vi, i > k.
Given these bids, total payments from each bidder are bi+1ci.
Can any bidder, given some order of bidding, improve their profit
from that received with the bids in Equation 4? They can not. First,
the following lemma shows that under any perturbation of the order of
bids, equilibria must still be eﬃcient. The idea behind this proof is
that, when a bidder with low private value tries to bid higher than a
bidder with high private value, there is always an interval of optimal
bids for the high private value bidder which will cause the low private
value bidder to wish to switch her bid - that is, the vector of bids will
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not be in equilibrium.
Since the bids must be eﬃcient, every bidder knows that her profit
is maximized by minimizing the bid of the bidder whose private value is
directly below their own. In that case, if a bidder bids before the player
with private value one spot lower than her, she will bid as in the private
value OHE. If a bidder bids after the player one spot below her, she
takes that player’s bid as given, and bids somewhere in the interval that
keeps her in her eﬃcient slot.
Lemma 13 Equilibria to perturbed order hierarchical game are eﬃcient.
Proof. Let bi < bj, vi > vj > vk. Let j bid before i. Assume that
bids are in equilibrium. Bidder i receives profit πi = (vi − bk)ci and
bidder j receives profit πj = (vj − bi)cj. If bidder j bids directly below
i instead, she will receive (vj − bk)ci. Since bids are in equilibrium,
(vj − bi)cj ≥ (vj − bk)ci and therefore bi ≤ vj − (vj − bk) cicj .
Note that bidder i makes profit
(vi − bk)ci = vici − bkci (5)
by letting bi ≤ vj − (vj − bk) cicj , but makes profit (vi − bj)cj by letting
bi > vj − (vj − bk) cicj since j will then bid below i. In that case, since bj
will be less than bi, and since bi can be as low as vj − (vj − bk) cicj , profit
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for bidder i will be (vi − bj)cj ≥ (vi − (vj − (vj − bk) cicj ))cj =
vicj − bkci + vj(ci − cj). (6)
As in the private-value ordering, note that profit in Eq. 6 is always
greater than that of Eq. 5, since
vi(cj − ci) > vj(cj − ci)
⇒ vi(cj − ci) + bkci > vj(cj − ci) + bkci
⇒ vi(ci − cj)− bkci < vj(ci − cj)− bkci
⇒ vici − bkci < vicj − bkci + vj(ci − cj).
Finally, note that unless bj ≥ vi− (vi− bk) cicj , bidder i will bid higher
than bidder j, which would contradict the assumption that bids are in
equilibrium. But since vi−(vi−bk) cicj > vj−(vj−bk)
ci
cj
, if bj ≥ vi−(vi−
bk)
ci
cj
, there must exist some bi ∈ (vj − (vj − bk) cicj , vi − (vi − bk)
ci
cj
) such
that bidder j would prefer to have bid below bidder i. This contradicts
the assumption that bi < bj can be an equilibrium.
Lemma 14 Equilibria to the perturbed order hierarchical game give every
bidder profit no larger than that of the private-value OHE.
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Proof. The previous lemma shows that equilibria to the perturbed
order hierarchical game are eﬃcient. Since the equilibria must be eﬃ-
cient, bids are constrained by the Nash intervals in Equation 3. That
is, players must bid in the intervals
bN = vN
bN−1=(vN ,min{bN−2, vN−2 − (vN−2 − bN)cN−1
cN−2
})
...
bi=(vi+1 − (vi+1 − bi+2)
ci+1
ci
,min{bi−1, vi−1 − (vi−1 − bi+1) ci
ci−1
})
...
b2=(v3 − (v3 − b4)
c3
c2
,min{b1, v1 − (v1 − b3)c2
c1
})
b1=(v2 − (v2 − b3)
c2
c1
,∞)
If a player bids before the player whose private value is directly below her,
she wants to minimize that player’s bid as in the private-value ordering,
and will therefore bid exactly as in the private value OHE from Equation
4. If a player bids after the player whose private value is directly below
her, she will bid anywhere in the Nash interval that makes the players
above her and below her unwilling to outbid or underbid her, as in the
case of bidder k in the private value OHE. Since the bids for bidders
i < k in the private value OHE are equal to the minimum of the Nash
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interval, and the equilibrium bids for bidders i ≥ k are identical in the
perturbed order case and in the private value OHE, bids for every player
are at least as high in the perturbed order equilibrium as in the private
value OHE. Therefore, the payments in the perturbed order equilibrium
are at least as high as in the OHE, and the resultant profits are no higher,
for all bidders.
Proposition 15 Equilibria to the hierarchical game are equivalent to
the private value OHE.
Proof. The previous lemma establishes that every player has profits
in a perturbed order auction that are no higher than their profits in the
private value OHE. Therefore, no player has an incentive to change their
bid once the private value OHE is reached, regardless of what order they
are allowed to bid in.
OHE possess a few interesting properties. First, the constraints of
hierarchical bidding in Eq. 3 are simply the set of Nash equilibria, so
OHE are a subset of Nash equilibria. Second, consider the payments
induced by the truthful VCG mechanism. VCG with truthful revela-
tion induces payments of zero for bidders i > k, and total payments
of
PN
a=i(ca − ca+1)va+1 for each bidder i ≤ k. That is, bidder k pays
ckvk+1, bidder k−1 pays (ck−1−ck)vk+ckvk+1, and so on. The following
42
proposition shows that VCG payments for every bidder are at least as
big as the payments in any OHE, and therefore that auctioneer revenue
is higher under VCG than under OHE.
Proposition 16 VCG revenue is greater than or equal to OHE revenue.
Proof. Consider the highest-revenue OHE equilibrium, where bidder
k bids bi−1. Since VCG and OHE are both eﬃcient, revenue for all
bidders is the same with both mechanisms. Under both VCG and
OHE, payments for bidder k are vk+1ck. Under the highest-revenue
OHE, payments for bidder k − 1 are bk−1ck−1. For all other bidders,
highest-revenue OHE payments for bidder i are bi+1ci ≤ bici = ci(vi+1−
(vi+1−bi+2) ci+1ci ) = vi+1(ci−ci+1)+ci+1bi+2 ≤ vi+1(ci−ci+1)+ci+1bi+1 ≤
· · · ≤ PNa=i(ca − ca+1)va+1 = VCG payments.
The following numerical example displays the above properties.
Example 17 Consider a GSP auction with v = [11, 8, 7, 1] and c =
[10, 2, 1, 0]. Under VCG, bidder 4 pays 0, bidder 3 pays (1− 0) ∗ 1 = 1,
bidder 2 pays (2− 1) ∗ 7+1 = 8, and bidder 1 pays (10− 2) ∗ 8+8 = 72.
Total auctioneer revenue is 81. OHE bids are [7.20, 4, (1, 4), 1]. The
total payment vector, then, is [40, (2, 8), 1], and auctioneer revenue is
[43, 49] < 81.
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Edelman et al (2007) propose reasons why auctioneers might be using
GSP rather than VCG to sell keywords, even though VCG requires bid-
ders simply to submit their true private values and would therefore seem
to be make bidding much simpler for potential advertisers. Under their
locally envy-free equilibria, which assumed simultaneous bidding, VCG
provides the lowest-possible auctioneer revenue, so auctioneers might
rightfully be unwilling to switch to a mechanism that guarantees minimal
revenue. However, if bids are hierarchical in nature, OHE guarantees
that VCG has higher revenue than any GSP equilibria.
5 Extension: Endogenous Slots
In this section, we describe a straightforward extension of the hierarchi-
cal bidding model where the auctioneer endogenizes the number of slots
available based on the current vector of bids. For mathematical sim-
plicity, in Section 4 we followed the literature by letting the number of
slots equal a constant k ≤ n. Let k = n be the greatest number of slots
an auctioneer can oﬀer. If an auctioneer can costlessly remove slots,
and by removing them improve auctioneer revenue, then endogenous k
allows a more robust formulation of auctioneer problem. It turns out to
be the case that, for any vector of private values and clickthrough rates,
the auctioneer can improve revenue by removing slots for some values of
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k.
Consider an auction with n bidders and the maximum number of
slots k = n. In this situation, the kth bidder pays nothing for her
advertisements. More importantly, her equilibrium bid, as shown in
Section 4, is in the interval (vi+1,min{bi−1, vi−1−(vi−1−bi+1) cici−1}), where
vi+1 = 0. Bidders k < n then bid their OHE value vi+1−(vi+1−bi+2) ci+1ci .
Bidder k−1 optimally bids only (1− ck
ck−1
)vk < vk. These two equations
imply that both bk and bk−1 are lower than vk. In the case where
k = n − 1, the kth bidder will bid her private value, and bidder k − 1
will be in some interval above that. That is, the bottom two bids are
higher in the k = n− 1 case than in the k = n case. Since every other
bid can be solved recursively as an increasing function of these two bids,
since payments are based on these bids, and since the kth bidder pays
zero to the auctioneer in both cases, it must be the case that removing
the bottom slot from this auction increases auctioneer revenue.
Proposition 18 For any vectors c and v, the auctioneer has higher
OHE revenue with n = k − 1 than with n = k.
Proof. Let n = k. In equilibrium, the bidder with the lowest
private value bids in the interval (0, bk−1), the bidder with the second
lowest private value bids vk − (vk − 0) ckck−1 = (1 −
ck
ck−1
)vk < vk, and
all other bidders bid vi+1 − (vi+1 − bi+2) ci+1ci = vi+1(1−
ci+1
ci
) + bi+2
ci+1
ci
,
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which is an increasing function of bi+2. Revenue to the auctioneer is
(0, (1− ck
ck−1
)vk)ck−1+(1− ck−1ck−2 )vkck−2+
PN
i=k−3 ci(vi+1(1− ci+1ci )+bi+2
ci+1
ci
).
Now consider the case where cN = 0; that is, k = n−1. The bidder with
lowest private value bids vk, the bidder with the second lowest private
value bids in the interval (vk, bk−2), and all other bidders bid vi+1 −
(vi+1 − bi+2) ci+1ci = vi+1(1−
ci+1
ci
) + bi+2
ci+1
ci
. Revenue to the auctioneer,
then, is vkck−1+(vk, bk−2)ck−2+
PN
i=k−3 ck(vi+1(1− ci+1ci )+bi+2
ci+1
ci
). Since
the payments of every bidder are strictly higher than in the case where
n = k, auctioneer revenue improves by removing the final slot.
The following example gives revenue under two situations with en-
dogenous slots.
Example 19 Let v = [10, 4, 2], and c = [3, 2, 1]. In the case where k =
3, OHE bids are [2, 1, (0, 1)]. Revenue to the auctioneer is 3+(0, 2)+0 =
(3, 5). If the auctioneer auctions only two slots (c = [3, 2, 0]), OHE bids
are [3, (2, 3), 2]. Revenue to the auctioneer is (6, 9) + 4 = (10, 13). In
this example, endogenizing slots can triple auctioneer revenue.
The benefit to the auctioneer from removing slots other than the nth
is more diﬃcult to compute, and depend on the auctioneer’s belief about
the distribution of bidder private values.
Finally, note that this result is worrying for the eﬃciency properties
of GSP even under hierarchical bidding. If slots are endogenous, GSP is
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no longer eﬃcient. Under the VCGmechanism, total auctioneer revenue
is equal to
PN
i=1
Pk
a=i(ca − ca+1)va+1, which is increasing in k. There
is no incentive under VCG to restrict the number of slots. Therefore,
VCG might be preferable to GSP not only because auctioneer revenue
is higher, but also because it guarantees eﬃciency.
6 Conclusion
Keyword auctions are now the most important source of revenue in the
rapidly growing online advertisement market. The novelty of auctions
with multiple slots and continuous updating of bids remains poorly un-
derstood, however. This paper presents an equilibrium for a generalized
second-price auction where bids are submitted in a hierarchy, with every
bidder acting as a Stackelberg follower when it comes to previous bids.
The properties of these ordered hierarchical equilibria are very diﬀer-
ent from that of the locally envy-free and Nash equilibria examined in
previous papers.
We show that ordered hierarchical equilibria always give lower auc-
tioneer revenue than any locally envy-free equilibrium, and in particu-
lar, lower revenue than the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Further,
when the number of slots sold is endogenized by the auctioneer, ordered
hierarchical equilibria lose the eﬃciency property, which VCGmaintains.
Because of this, and contrary to earlier research, it may be optimal from
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a revenue perspective for auctioneers to adopt VCG payments instead
of a second-price auction, with the side benefit that bid calculations are
significantly simpler for advertisers in VCG.
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A Appendix: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism induces bidders to reveal true
private values by aligning the incentives of both the bidders and a mech-
anism designer who desires truthful revelation. The section modifies a
discussion in Varian (2007).
Consider a case with n agents. Let the mechanism designer choose
some assignment of bidders to slots z, and let each agent have a true
private value for each ordering vi(z) but signal to the mechanism designer
a value si(z). If the mechanism designer oﬀers to maximize the sum of
bidder reported values, si(z)+
P
i6=j sj(z), and bidder i truly cares about
maximizing vi(z)+
P
i6=j sj(z), then it is optimal for the bidder to simply
submit her true value, or si(z) = vi(z).
In this case, the mechanism designer is paying each bidder in order
to extract true private values. In order to minimize the sum of these
payments, an amount that is independent from the reported value of
the agent can be subtracted. Let the subtracted payment equal the
maximized sum of reported values for each ordering if bidder i were
excluded. The payment to bidder i is then
vi(z) +
X
i6=j
sj(z)−max
y
X
i6=j
sj(y).
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Since every bidder now is best oﬀ by submitting her true private
values, and since in the absence of bidder i, all bidders below bidder i
will move up one slot, the above equation simplifies to
vici −
X
j>i
vj+1(ci − ci+1).
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